EU auditors warn Russian energy exit is faltering

European auditors have raised concerns over the implementation of the EU’s plan to end its dependence on Russian fossil fuels, warning that investment commitments remain well below the scale identified when the REPowerEU programme was launched.

The European Court of Auditors assessed how the bloc has implemented the energy-security strategy introduced after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The programme was intended to cut dependence on Russian supplies while accelerating investment in alternative energy and infrastructure.

The EU has substantially reduced its direct exposure to Russian gas. Russia accounted for around 45% of EU gas imports before the invasion, compared with approximately 12% now, while restrictions have also reduced other Russian fossil-fuel flows.

The auditors nevertheless warn that part of the adjustment has relied on conditions that may not persist, including mild weather, high prices suppressing demand, and reductions in industrial energy consumption.

Investment is a central concern. REPowerEU initially identified approximately €300bn of investment requirements, while €54.3bn had been committed by member states as of the auditors’ assessment.

The difference does not mean the remaining amount must be financed directly from the EU budget. Energy infrastructure is funded through national governments, private capital, utilities, banks, and several European programmes. The gap does raise questions over whether enough investment is moving into delivery.

Those concerns are becoming more immediate as energy markets experience renewed geopolitical disruption. Gas storage levels are lower than at the equivalent point last year, while instability in the Middle East has pushed oil prices higher and increased uncertainty around global fuel supply.

The EU is also moving towards a 2027 ban on Russian liquefied natural gas, increasing the importance of alternative supply, domestic generation, storage, interconnection, and demand management.

The original Russian gas shock demonstrated the direct connection between energy security and industrial competitiveness. Chemicals, metals, glass, ceramics, fertiliser, and other energy-intensive industries experienced sharp cost increases as pipeline supplies contracted.

Some of that pressure subsequently eased, but European energy costs remain an important factor in industrial investment decisions. A disorderly final phase of the Russian exit could therefore affect manufacturing output and capital spending as well as household energy bills.

Electricity networks form another part of the challenge. Renewable generation can sometimes be developed more quickly than transmission infrastructure, while planning, permitting, storage, and grid connections can take years.

Demand is also increasing from data centres, electric transport, heat pumps, and the electrification of industrial processes. Europe is therefore trying to reduce fossil-fuel exposure while simultaneously expanding the role of electricity across the economy.

That creates a sequencing problem. Generation and network investment must arrive quickly enough to support new demand without creating capacity shortages or persistent price pressure.

The European Commission has said it is accelerating renewable deployment and will consider the auditors’ recommendations. Member states retain substantial responsibility for permitting, energy-market design, infrastructure planning, and the national delivery of investment.

REPowerEU also overlaps with national recovery programmes, climate policy, state aid, private utility spending, and other European funding streams. That makes the contribution of any one programme difficult to assess solely through headline funding figures.

The audit nevertheless shifts attention from the achievement of reducing Russian imports towards the durability of what replaces them. Lower dependence is strategically significant, but energy security ultimately requires adequate generation, networks, storage, and alternative supply rather than continued reliance on suppressed demand.

That distinction becomes more important as geopolitical disruption affects energy flows beyond Russia. Europe cannot assume the wider international fuel market will always provide cheap alternatives during periods of shortage.

The next phase of the Russian energy exit will therefore be judged less by the proportion of imports coming from Moscow and more by the resilience of the European energy system that has been built in its place.