More than half of government risk professionals surveyed by the National Audit Office say their involvement in major decisions comes too late to influence the outcome, is largely restricted to reviewing existing proposals, or is absent altogether.
The findings raise concerns about how effectively government departments use specialist advice when making spending, policy, and operational decisions.
A review by the National Audit Office (NAO) found that public bodies have strengthened the systems and guidance supporting risk management, but progress in applying that expertise remains inconsistent.
The report, Risk management in government: improving capability and decision-making, identifies gaps in senior leadership engagement, the use of early warning information, and the oversight of risks extending across organisational boundaries.
It also found limited evidence that the input of risk professionals routinely changes major decisions or the direction of government organisations.
The watchdog is calling for risk assessment to become part of decision-making from the outset rather than being used primarily to approve or review decisions after they have been shaped.
Central government established its Risk Profession in 2022, supported by a Risk Centre of Excellence within HM Treasury.
The centre provides training, tools, and guidance to improve professional capability and encourage more consistent risk management practices.
Among surveyed professionals who answered questions about the centre, 98% had engaged with its tools or guidance, while 84% considered its work useful.
Those figures demonstrate substantial use of the available support, but do not establish that departments consistently apply risk advice when making decisions.
Connecting risk expertise with leadership —
Government organisations manage threats ranging from cyber incidents and fraud to workforce shortages, infrastructure disruption, and failures in major programmes.
Some of those risks can be identified through operational performance information or early warning indicators before they develop into significant problems.
The NAO found that public bodies do not always make sufficient use of that information, limiting their ability to anticipate emerging difficulties and take preventive action.
Risk management arrangements also differ between organisations. While some senior leaders actively involve specialists in planning, others give the function limited priority or treat it primarily as a compliance requirement.
Formal processes can establish whether risks have been recorded and assessed. Their effectiveness depends on whether the findings influence decisions about resources, delivery plans, and acceptable levels of exposure.
The NAO identified examples of stronger practice.
At the Bank of England, an approach encouraging employees to raise concerns openly supported collaboration during the modernisation of a critical payments system.
The review found that this helped establish shared accountability and allowed risks to be discussed before they became more difficult to manage.
At the UK Hydrographic Office, a risk dashboard improved senior leaders’ visibility of outstanding concerns and the actions being taken to address them.
Managers used the information to follow up with teams, contributing to a substantial reduction in unresolved actions.
These examples illustrate different ways risk information can be incorporated into established management processes without relying solely on additional reporting requirements.
Managing risks across organisations —
The NAO also identified weaknesses in the coordination of risks involving several public bodies.
Major government programmes often depend on departments, arm’s-length organisations, external suppliers, and local authorities working together.
A disruption affecting one organisation can create problems elsewhere, particularly where services depend on shared infrastructure, information, funding, or delivery arrangements.
The watchdog found that some arm’s-length bodies had limited contact with the risk teams of their sponsoring departments.
That separation can make it harder to establish a common understanding of threats or agree which organisation should respond before problems escalate.
These arrangements are relevant to government suppliers, which may operate within programmes where several organisations are responsible for connected elements of delivery.
The NAO expects the challenge of coordinating risks across organisational boundaries to become increasingly important as additional responsibilities and spending decisions are devolved to mayors and local government.
Its recommendations include clearer expectations for senior leaders, practical training to improve their understanding of risk, and organisational cultures that encourage employees to raise concerns early.
It also wants stronger arrangements for identifying, escalating, and responding to threats that extend across departments or geographical areas.
The review does not calculate the overall value for money of government spending on risk management. Its findings concern how effectively the existing capabilities support decisions and public service delivery.
The NAO concludes that government has improved the foundations of risk management, but must do more to ensure specialist advice influences how public bodies plan, allocate resources, and deliver services.




